Tag Archives: apologists

Arguing About Evil: Two Kinds of Argument

Part of the Arguing About Evil series.

The problem of evil, or argument from evil, comes in two conventionally recognized forms: logical problems of evil and evidential problems of evil.

Logical problems of evil aim to show that the presence of evil is logically inconsistent with the claim that there exists a being which is omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good. In other words, logical problems of evil argue that if evil exists, then the claim that God exists cannot be true, and vice versa. If a logical argument from evil succeeds, then theism is false. Theists respond to logical problems of evil by showing that there exists a possible reason for the existence of evil, which would show that God’s non-existence is not necessitated by the presence of evil. An example of this is Plantinga’s famous free-will defense, which we’ll look at in one of the posts in this series.

The evidential problem of evil, on the other hand, aims to show not that God’s existence given the existence of evil is impossible, but that it is very unlikely. In this case, pointing out a possible reason for the existence of evil would not work. Theists typically respond by trying to show, “with at least a fair degree of probability, what God’s actual reason for permitting evil is.” (Everitt, p. 229) Examples of these attempts include the free-will theodicy (the claim that a world with free will and evil is better than a world with no evil and no free will) and the soul-making theodicy (the claim that evil serves what can loosely be called a character-building function). A successful evidential argument from evil would not show that theism is certainly false, but only that it is implausible or improbable.

Furthermore, both kinds of the argument from evil can rely on more than just the plain fact that evil exists. According to Everitt, “Some authors… distinguish between different versions of the logical problem, and also different versions of the evidential problem according to whether the focus is on the existence of evil per se, or on the huge total amount, or on the distribution, or on the awfulness of the worst evils, etc.” (Everitt, p. 228) One can also distinguish the kinds of evil that these arguments rely on into two kinds: natural and moral evils. Moral evil typically consists of evil brought about by human activity, such as torture and other forms of cruelty, or deceit, or acting solely for personal gain. Natural evils cover the broad spectrum of evils brought about by the normal operation of the laws of nature, such as disease and natural disasters.

Next post, we’ll look at an example of a logical problem of evil.

A Few Notes and Questions About Eddy and Boyd’s The Jesus Legend (Part 2)

Readers of my last post will know that I am concerned that Christian apologists – a term that probably accurately describes Paul Rhodes Eddy and Gregory Boyd, authors of The Jesus Legend – may not give naturalism enough credit. Readers may remember that Eddy and Boyd believe that biblical historical criticism is not critical enough, that, in short, it takes its naturalistic assumptions for granted, and these, in turn, arbitrarily eliminate supernatural hypotheses and explanations as potential answers.  I will eventually write more about naturalism’s relation to Christian apologetics. Today, I will focus on a second question raised by my reading of The Jesus Legend and the argument made in the book, one that relates to supernatural explanations. The question, to get straight to the point, is this:

  • What informs the content of our supernatural explanations?

This might seem like a strange question, since questions about supernatural explanations usually involve the possibility of the supernatural or their explanatory power. This question was prompted by a specific example used by Eddy and Boyd in their book, and which I mentioned in my last post, “demonization” or “demon possession”. Eddy and Boyd write:

“To the thinking of most who witness phenomena like these – and the authors of this work count themselves among them – attempts to explain some of these phenomena in strictly natural terms are implausible, to say the least. The same could be said about a host of other supernatural phenomena that ‘present human experience’ includes – if we step outside the shallow pool of experience represented by the naturalistic Western worldview.” (Kindle Location, 1103)

I pointed out in my last post that, despite these events seeming supernatural to “most” people who witness them, Eddy and Boyd do not dispute that “some, if not the majority” of these reports of the supernatural can be explained in naturalistic terms. (Kindle Location, 1108). Indeed, they are careful to write only of “reports” and “claims” of the supernatural, rather than point to a specific example of the supernatural which refutes ontological naturalism as a true metaphysical description of reality. Nor do they disavow a preference for naturalistic explanations. They do, however, appear to believe that demon possession actually occurs.

I initially was only interested in why “demon possession”, (as in, a person becomes possessed by a malevolent spirit) is thought to be the best explanation for certain kinds of behavior. My interest became somewhat more nuanced as I read more of The Jesus Legend, seeing that Eddy and Boyd weren’t directly arguing that the resurrection was the best explanation for the evidence, but that the explanations used by legendary Jesus theorists didn’t adequately explain their presentations of the evidence, leaving only the explanation preferred by the Christian apologist to fill the gap. But that doesn’t mean that particular supernatural explanation is a good explanation, nor that it is better than other supernatural explanations one can think of.

There is no indication in The Jesus Legend that Eddy and Boyd have considered alternative supernatural theories that explain what they call demon possession (and the same applies to the resurrection, if am I remembering correctly), which leaves me wondering whether these explanations are dependent for their content on readily available examples of the supernatural. If reports of demon possession are as widespread as Eddy and Boyd claim they are, and if most of these reports can be explained in naturalistic way (as Eddy and Boyd also suggest), why should not one think that existing superstition is influencing the kinds of supernatural explanations we give for events that are difficult to explain? Would any of the symptoms of demon possession lead us to infer that a malevolent spirit had entered the victim’s body if there was not already an association between demon possession and those symptoms in our culture? What if those symptoms are equally well explained by the existence of a supernatural bacterium?

I don’t know, and I don’t expect I’ll have the answers soon. It’s not something The Jesus Legend covers, despite being a book that purportedly concerns itself with methodology. Perhaps, eventually, I’ll come across a work of apologetics that doesn’t take for granted the possibility of other supernatural explanations.

Reading Jesus Interrupted – Part 1

Earlier this week I wrote that I would be taking the Ultimate Truth Seeker Challenge made back in 2010 by Luke Muelhauser of commonsenseatheism. Now, I’m halfway through Bart D. Ehrman’s Jesus Interrupted. Ehrman is an agnostic and an author of several popular works about early Christianity and the New Testament. Jesus Interrupted is not a book that sets out to debunk Christianity. Rather, its aim is to present an accessible overview of the scholarly consensus in biblical studies about a number of issues, including Biblical authorship, the reliability of the books found in the Bible and the historical Jesus. Ehrman’s aim, as he explains in the first chapter, is to make known to the churchgoing public what is established and uncontroversial to Biblical scholars. He explains that there is a huge difference between what the public learns from their pastors (at least in the United States) and what academics know about the Bible. This point has particular resonance for me, because it parallels my experience with Christianity. Almost none of this basic information about the Bible was, to my recollection, discussed or explained in the hundreds of sermons I’ve heard or the numerous catechism classes I attended. (I was vaguely aware of the New Testament Apocrypha, which were referred to once and twice in a positive way.)

Ehrman, in the first four chapters, makes three important points, which you can read as a quick summary of the rest of this post.

  1. We don’t know who wrote most of the books in the New Testament. The Gospels were probably not written by eyewitnesses, and there are books or letters whose authenticity is disputed in the New Testament canon.
  2. The authors of these books had different opinions about who Jesus was, and did not necessarily agree with each other about his teachings. They interpreted and presented them differently, leading to discrepancies between them.
  3. These books are not inerrant. There are mistakes, later additions by editors and contradictory claims.

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