Monthly Archives: April 2015

Updates

To start with, I don’t think I will finish reviewing Reasonable Faith. I had two chapters left to blog about, but there isn’t anything worthwhile I can write about them at this point, other than summaries, and William Lane Craig’s debates on the resurrection (which can be found on Youtube) will give you a much better picture of these arguments than my summaries would. I would like to analyze these chapters in some detail, but currently I lack the requisite background knowledge to evaluate them. I’ll be able to post reviews of Letters to Doubting Thomas and The Christian Delusion very soon. These are somewhat easier to review, but I doubt there will be much in terms of analysis on my part.

I’m also setting up a Bibliography page. This will host books I consider worth reading, if you’re interested in religion, philosophy of religion, Christianity and other related topics. Some of the books will be easier than others to read and I’ll point these out. Note, that not everything I read will immediately make into the bibliography, and there will probably be books that won’t make the cut.

Some Concerns

As I’m writing this, I’m halfway through the Ultimate Truth Seeker Challenge (although I am still blogging my way through the second of the books I’ve chosen to read). At this point, I think it has become clear to me that there are a few problems have to be dealt with.

  • First, I don’t have the knowledge to evaluate some of the arguments being made in these books. For instance, having read Jesus Interrupted, Reasonable Faith and The Christian Delusion, I’ve found two very different pictures of the historical Jesus. Bart Ehrman argues that Jesus was really a Jewish apocalyptic prophet, who predicted the coming of the kingdom in his day and age. William Lane Craig argues for a more traditional and Christian understanding of Jesus and, if I am not mistaken, makes no reference to other understandings of Jesus (such as the one described by Ehrman). I don’t know what to make of such different and apparently contrary positions without reading more.
  • Second, some of the books set by the challenge are too easy. I’ve skimmed through the contents of Guy P. Harrison’s 50 Reasons People Give for Believing in a God and I don’t see what I could gain from reading this book. It seems to be aimed at people who have never seriously thought about their beliefs and just take them for granted. Contending with Christianity’s Critics also appears to set the bar a bit low, since it aims to respond to the New Atheists. I’ve read some stuff by Hitchens and Dawkins and others years ago, and while they probably made an impression on me when I was completely new to the debate, I don’t feel I need to deal with them now. What I remember of them doesn’t seem convincing to me.
  • Third, the books don’t seem be interacting well with each other. Granted, I’m only halfway through the list, but the scope of the books I’ve read defending Christianity seems much broader than those of the skeptical works. For example, Reasonable Faith argues that miracles are possible and can be demonstrated to be probable, provides a series of arguments or the existence of God, presents a view of the historical Jesus and also argues that the resurrection is the best explanation for the historical evidence we have. Meanwhile, Jesus Interrupted barely touches upon the question of miracles (and I think Craig provides the better argument here, unless I’ve misread Ehrman somehow) and provides a lot of useful general information about the Bible and the historical Jesus. At best, Ehrman’s book can be opposed to a single chapter in Reasonable Faith. The Christian Delusion (one of the books I’ve read but haven’t reviewed yet) consists of about fifteen essays. Many of these are interesting, and some of them are probably important to keep in mind, but very few of them have anything to say about the arguments found in Reasonable Faith or Layman’s Letters to Doubting Thomas (which I’m reading at the moment). Harrison’s 50 Reasons People Give for Believing in a God almost certainly doesn’t engage these arguments either, which leaves Richard Carrier’s Sense and Goodness Without God. This seems like a rather heavy burden for a single book to bear, even though I haven’t considered the arguments found in Contending with Christianity’s Critics or Swinburne’s Is There a God?. (One might also mention that Carrier is a historian, not a philosopher, unlike the authors of the apologetic works).

As a solution to these problems, I’m planning to increase my general knowledge relating to these topics. There are a few books I’m considering, although it’s a bit difficult to find which books are reliable (especially about the historical Jesus and the New Testament) . I’m also planning to read more difficult books which discuss these arguments. I’ve already set my eyes on Theism and Explanation by Gregory Dawes, because it looks like it engages with Layman’s Letters to a Doubting Thomas and Swinburne’s Is There a God?. Layman’s book isn’t as advanced, though, so I’ll probably balance things out something else by Swinburne. All this is assuming that I don’t find Theism and Explanation too difficult to read. I’ve never studied philosophy, so this solution might not work for me.

60 Years On: Academic Atheist Philosophers Then & Now

Graham Oppy gives an overview of the history of academic atheistic philosophy since 1955.

Link is here.

Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence

In my last post, I said I would look at William Lane Craig’s consideration of a common skeptical slogan, which is that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence (henceforth, ‘ECREE’). I suspect Craig has frequently encountered skeptics who misuse it, and given that in Reasonable Faith he is arming Christians with apologetic arguments, it makes sense for him to deal with these misunderstandings. In Chapter 6, he deals with some interpretations of ECREE, finally writing:

“What the skeptic seems to be saying by his slogan is that in order to believe rationally in a miraculous event, you must have an enormous amount of evidence.” (p. 273)

I agree with Craig that this interpretation of ECREE is incorrect, but there is still a correct interpretation of it, which I think remains useful. Note, I am not saying that Craig does not point this out. Before dealing with incorrect understandings of it, he writes:

“The only plausible sense in which the slogan is true is that in order to establish the occurrence of an event which has a very low intrinsic probability, then the evidence would also have to have a very low intrinsic probability…” (p. 273)

But he does sometimes give the impression that he rejects the slogan wholesale. Consider what he writes about an argument made by Stephen Law:

“This sounds so commonsensical, doesn’t it? But in fact it is demonstrably false. Probability theorists studying what sort of evidence it would take to establish a highly improbable event came to realize that if you just weigh the improbability of the event against the reliability of the testimony, we’d have to be sceptical of many commonly accepted claims. Rather what’s crucial is the probability that we should have the evidence we do if the extraordinary event had not occurred. This can easily offset any improbability of the event itself. In the case of the resurrection of Jesus, for example, this means that we must also ask, “What is the probability of the facts of the empty tomb, the post-mortem appearances, and the origin of the disciples’ belief in Jesus’ resurrection, if the resurrection had not occurred?” It is highly, highly, highly, improbable that we should have that evidence if the resurrection had not occurred.” (LINK)

In a 2008 debate with Keith Parsons, Craig also said, regarding ECREE:

“This is a watchword of the free thought movement today that I always hear repeated. But when I think about it, I can think of almost no justification for that principle. I do not think it is true that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.” (My transcript, approximately 40 minutes into the debate, during Craig’s first rebuttal)

He also points out that it doesn’t take extraordinary evidence to show that someone is alive or dead, and that to demonstrate that Jesus resurrected, all it would take is evidence that he was dead, and evidence that he was alive (after he was dead). This is, in a way, correct, but at the same time, I don’t see how this isn’t the sort of extraordinary evidence a more viable interpretation of ECREE demands (if that evidence is too improbable on our background evidence if Jesus didn’t rise from the dead). So, while I can say that Craig treated ECREE charitably in Reasonable Faith by pointing out its strongest interpretation, he, at the very least, does not seem to think skeptics generally mean it this way (which could easily be true).